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Abstract
I analyze a model of residential location choice where people derive utility from their proximity to
open space. When people have such landscape preferences then (1), equilibrium residential devel-
opment is mixed with undeveloped land (2), equilibrium land price gradients depend sensitively
on how land markets are organized, are not generally monotonic, and may or may not reﬂect the
value of open-space, and (3), dynamic equilibria generally have the property that more remote
areas are developed before more central areas. Finally, when compared to optimal development,
equilibrium development houses too many residents, too close together, and remote areas are
developed too soon. These results imply that equilibrium development may not be sprawling
enough and that policies to encourage inﬁll development are not welfare improving.
KEYWORDS: Sprawl, Landscape preferences. J.E.L.: R2, H0.1. Introduction
The importance of open space in developed landscapes is conﬁrmed by a drive through almost
any new suburb and by recent empirical work.1 For example, J. Geoghegan [1] ﬁnds that 47%
of the land within 1600m of an average house in suburban Maryland is undeveloped,2 while M.
Burchﬁeld, H. G. Overman, D. Puga and M. A. Turner [2] ﬁnd that new residential development
strongly favors areas where old development covers only a small fraction of the surrounding
square kilometer. In addition, casual empiricism and a small empirical literature indicate that
people care a great deal about the characteristics of their residential landscape. In particular, they
care about the amount and quality of nearby open space. Given this taste for open space and the
prevalence of open space in our residential landscapes, it is important to assess the implications of
landscape preferences for the development of equilibrium and optimal cities.
The preservation and development of open space are also central issues in the ongoing debate
about urban sprawl. For example, the American Planning Association [3], the American Institute
of Architects [4], the Urban Land Institute (D. J. O’Neill [5]), and the Sierra club [6], all advocate
‘inﬁll development’, i.e., the development of vacant land in the interior of cities, as an alternative
to more sprawling cities. Interest in land use policy also extends outside of these interest groups:
between 1998 and 2001, more than 500 measures raising public revenues for land acquisition were
approved by voters across the United States (Trust for Public Land [7]), and a number of cities
have created ‘greenbelts’ around their periphery where development is forbidden. It is important
to investigate the implications that these different land use policies have for the development of
cities and the welfare of their inhabitants. Given the importance of landscape preferences, it makes
sense to conduct this investigation in a theoretical framework which allows for such preferences.
The existing literature, however, provides little insight into the role of landscape preferences
as a determinant of residential location choice, and less about the optimal choice of open space
policy. With few exceptions, existing theoretical models of urban spatial structure do not allow
for the possibility that people care about the residential landscape. This paper begins the work
of understanding the role of landscape preferences as a determinant of patterns of residential
location. Speciﬁcally, I consider a model of residential location choice in which people have a
taste for proximity to open space.
2. Related literature
The principal innovation of the model developed here is that it allows people to derive utility
from open space near their residential location. While common sense and casual empiricism alone
make a strong case for this, there is also an empirical literature devoted to the measurement of
1I am grateful for the support of SSHRC and the National Fellows program at the Hoover Institution. I am also
grateful to Jan Breuckner, Vern Henderson, Janet Kohlhase, Diego Puga, Elena Saﬁrovia, Will Strange, and seminar
participants at SUNY Buffalo and the University of Minnesota for helpful comments.
2Undeveloped land here falls into two categories; ‘Developable open space’ which is made up of agricultural
cropland, pasture and forest, and ‘Permanent open space’, which is made up of parks and land subject to conservation
easements.
1such landscape preferences.3 This literature ﬁnds strong evidence that people have a taste for
open space near their houses.
A second literature relevant to this analysis examines the role of positive production extern-
alities in the formation of cities. This literature is interested in understanding the implications
of ‘knowledge spillovers’ which allow ﬁrms working in close proximity to work more efﬁciently
than ﬁrms which are isolated from each other. An analysis of knowledge spillovers is similar to
an analysis of landscape preferences. In the case of knowledge spillovers, agents impose positive
spillovers on their neighbors by locating nearby. In the case where agents have a taste for open
space, agents impose negative externalities on their neighbors by locating nearby and occupying
valuable open space.
Often the literature on knowledge spillovers treats production externalities as being constant
within an agglomeration of production activity, e.g., J. V. Henderson and A. Mitra [14], and thus
provides little basis for thinking about the ﬁne details of spatial structure within neighborhoods.
There are exceptions to this, however. M. Fujita and H. Ogawa [15], R. W. Helsley [16], M. Berliant,
S. Peng and P. Wang [17], and, R. E. Lucas, Jr. and E. Rossi-Hansberg [18], analyze cities in which
ﬁrms have tastes about the number and proximity of nearby ﬁrms. For example, ﬁrms in R.
E. Lucas, Jr. and E. Rossi-Hansberg [18] become more productive as the amount of production
activity in their proximity increases, but the impact of a unit increase in nearby production activity
decays exponentially with its distance from the target ﬁrm. Unlike the canonical monocentric city
model where ﬁrms care only about land prices, in models with neighborhood externalities, ﬁrms
care about the location of all other ﬁrms and land prices when making location choices. This
complicates the analysis of these models tremendously.
A third related literature provides other possible explanations of open space within city bound-
aries. In particular, this literature suggests three mechanisms that may give rise to open space in
the residential landscape. First, when investment decisions are irreversible it may be efﬁcient to
postpone development of certain parcels so that they can be developed in a way that better suits
future needs (J. C. Ohls and D. Pines [19], M. Fujita [20], D. E. Mills [21], J. K. Brueckner and B.
Vonrabenau [22], G. K. Turnbull [23], R. M. Braid [24, 25], M. Fujita [26]). Second, equilibrium
leapfrogging may also result from irreversible housing investment decisions when building takes
time and uncertainty over land rents increases with distance from the city center (A. Bar-Ilan and
W. C. Strange [27]). Each of these two mechanisms is able to generate open space as part of a pat-
tern of residential development. Third, exclusionary municipal zoning may lead to undeveloped
land as people decline to locate in highly regulated jurisdictions in favor of their less regulated
neighbors (K. T. Rosen and L. Katz [28], L. Katz and K. T. Rosen [29]).
Given that results in J. Geoghegan [1] and M. Burchﬁeld et al. [2] indicate that residential
landscapes often contain a high proportion of undeveloped land, it is clearly desirable to have
an arsenal of explanations with which to explain it, and each of the three explanations given above
is likely to contribute to the observed levels of open space. However, the model developed below
3 Examples include, S. D. Shultz and D. A. King [8], M. Kahn [9], J. Geoghegan, L. A. Wainger and N. E. Bockstael
[10], E. G. Irwin and N. E. Bockstael [11], E. G. Irwin [12] , and G. Acharya and L. Lewis Bennett [13]. See J. Geoghegan
[1] for a more extensive bibliography.
2is new to the literature and a back of the envelope calculation in section 6 suggests that a taste for
open space may, by itself, be able to explain a large share of observed open space.
With this said, there are a small number of theoretical investigations into the role that landscape
preferences play in the development of cities. R. Walsh [30] considers a Tiebout type model in
which people have preferences over the characteristics of the neighborhood landscape, the amount
of open space in particular. While this is an interesting analysis, since the Tiebout framework does
not allow an analysis of location choices at a scale smaller than the ‘neighborhood’, it is not well
suited to the analysis of the micro-structure of development that is undertaken here. L. Tajibaeva,
R. Haight and S. Polasky [31] consider a similar model. J. K. Brueckner [32] analyzes a city where
people have a taste for open space at the edge of a monocentric city. While this analysis is clearly
complementary to the present endeavor, the tastes under consideration are quite different. Perhaps
the closest competitor to this paper is W. C. Strange [33], which considers a similar spatial model
but does not model a land market. Finally, J. J. Wu and A. J. Plantinga [34] consider city formation
when people have a taste for proximity to exogenously located parks. While their analysis is also
interested in the role of open space in city formation, it does not consider the possibility that people
impose external costs on each other by their choice of location, and so has little relationship to the
current inquiry.
3. Static model
I would ultimately like to understand policies which govern the preservation and development of
open space in residential landscapes. To accomplish this, I consider a model of the development
that arises in response to an increased demand for housing at the edge of a city.
The ﬁrst step is to specify the cause of the increased demand for housing. The simplest option
is to require that a group of immigrants choose to locate in the city for reasons exogenous to
the model. Such a ‘closed city’ model is consistent with increases in housing demand due to
population growth in a city where there is little opportunity for migration. A second possibility is
tosupposethatthereisalargepoolofpotentialimmigrantswhomustchoosearesidentiallocation,
and that the city of interest has just experienced an exogenous shock that makes it attractive to
these immigrants. Such an ‘open city’ model is consistent with an economy where most population
growth is due to immigration and there is mobility across cities.
Both open and closed city models serve the purpose of creating a wave of immigrants interested
in locating in the subject city. However, given North America’s high rates of immigration and
mobility ( M. Burchﬁeld et al. [2]), the open city model seems the more accurate description of the
region’s development process. Since open city models are also marginally easier to analyze, the
analysis that follows is conducted in the context of an open city model. I have duplicated many of
the results that follow in the context of a closed city model and there are few interesting changes in
the results. Note that in both open and closed city models population increase is assumed to occur
in discrete waves rather than continuously. While this may be defensible as a stylized description
of the process by which people arrive in a city, the assumption is made chieﬂy to simplify the
model.
3To begin, consider a city that is in equilibrium until just before the analysis begins, at which
time local wages increase exogenously. Migration to the city occurs in response to this increase in
the local wage, and immigrants have the choice of a location in the city under study, or in some
other city. We consider new development that occurs at the city’s edge to house new arrivals.
Let Y = {1,...,m} denote the set of available locations, and y ∈ Y a particular location. Implicitly
y = 0 is the old city limit, the most extreme developed location in the pre-existing city, while each
subsequent location is one unit distance further from this old city limit. All locations to the left of
zero are assumed to be unavailable.4
The land at each location is owned by a landlord, each of whom owns exactly one location.
Index landlords by y ∈ Y where a landlord’s name also gives the location of his parcel. Let the
set of potential immigrants be N = {1,...,n} and let i index this set. Potential immigrants must
choose between a location in the area described by Y, or another location θ, implicitly some other
city. Denote immigrant i’s choice of location by yi ∈ Y
S
{θ}. Conversely, let i(y) denote the
immigrant(s) occupying location y, with i(y) = φ if y is unoccupied. Throughout the paper ’int(y)’
refers to the largest integer that is less than or equal to y. Let XN denote a location proﬁle, a set of
occupied locations in Y after all prospective immigrants have moved. If more than one immigrant
chooses the same location y, then the location proﬁle XN will contain multiple copies of y. If all
immigrants choose θ then XN is empty. Finally, let X−i denote a list of the location choices of all
immigrants but i, i.e., X−i = XN/yi.
Note that the model implicitly restricts all agents to choose lots of the same ﬁxed size. This
assumption is maintained during most of the analysis in the interests of tractability, but is relaxed
in section 5.
Each landlord chooses, py, a non-negative price for his land. If no immigrant chooses a land-
lord’s location then the landlord receives the prevailing price in the best non-residential land use.
To lighten notation, normalize this price to zero. Let P = {p1,..., pm} denote a choice of price for
all landlords, and P−y = P/py, a choice of price for all landlords but y.
All immigrants pay whatever price is associated with their choice of location and all immigrants
commute into the old city to work for wage w. The unit cost of commuting is the numeraire.
Immigrants receive a utility bonus δ if and only if both locations adjacent to the one they occupy
are vacant. Immigrants are averse to sharing a location, and if two immigrants occupy the same
location they receive a large negative payoff. Tenants who choose location θ get reservation utility
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w − yi − pyi + δ if yi is vacant and has no occupied neighbors
w − yi − pyi if yi is vacant and has at least one occupied neighbor
−∞ if yi is occupied by another immigrant
uθ if yi = θ.
(1)
This speciﬁcation of preferences requires that people care only about lots adjacent to their own.
Such extreme simplicity is desirable for the clarity and tractability it brings to the analysis. The
4Later results will show that the absence of available locations to the left of zero is not obviously consistent with the
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Figure 1. A characteristic equilibrium location profile for the simultaneous arrival game
with land transactions at opportunity cost. All locations satisfying w − y ≥ uθ are occu-
pied. Alternate spaces are occupied in the region where y satisfies w − y < uθ < w − y + δ.
Locations are not occupied if w − y + δ < uθ.
price of this simplicity is that these preferences cannot be regarded as being literally true. Instead,
they should be regarded as a stylization of the fact that people have a taste for ’nearby’ open space.
While the model is presented as describing individual location choices, there does not appear to
be any obstacle to regarding it as a model of subdevelopment location. In this case the ’immigrants’
are developers, lots are subdevelopments, and the open space premium measures the beneﬁts of
having an open ﬁeld adjacent to a subdevelopment. Arguably, this interpretation of the model
conforms more closely to observation than does the one adopted throughout the exposition.5
It is clearly of interest to analyze richer and more general preferences over landscapes. However
the empirical literature, as yet, provides little basis for reﬁning the statement that "people like to
have open space nearby".6 Given this, I make use of the current simple speciﬁcation to improve
tractability.
A. Simultaneous arrival game with land transactions at opportunity cost
To complete the speciﬁcation of the model it remains to describe the timing of moves and the
operation of the land market. I begin with the case where landlords are constrained to rent
land at its opportunity cost and immigrants move simultaneously. While these assumptions are
unrealistic, they provide the simplest possible environment in which to illustrate the incentives
that drive behavior in more complex models. Surprisingly, the equilibrium location proﬁle in all
of the games considered here is exactly the same as the one that emerges in this game without a
land market. Thus, besides its pedagogic value, the analysis of this simple game demonstrates the
robustness of the location patterns which emerge in this class of models.
5I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation of the model.
6For example, J. Geoghegan et al. [10] ﬁnd that open space within 100m of a house increases its value, but all else
equal housing prices decrease with open space between 200m and 1000m from a house. G. Acharya and L. Lewis
Bennett [13], on the other hand, ﬁnd that open space within one quarter mile and one mile of a house has about the
same effect on housing prices.
5Consider the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game in which all landlords are restricted to
choose py = 0 and all immigrants simultaneously choose a location from the set Y
S
{θ}. Thus,
a strategy for an immigrant is a mapping Si : X−i 7→ Y
S
{θ}, and an equilibrium is a choice of




N denote a Nash equilibrium proﬁle of location
choices.
For any given proﬁle of location choices, XN, let y denote the most extreme occupied space
and y denote the most extreme occupied space with at least one occupied neighbor. Theorem 1
provides a complete characterization of the equilibria of this game. Like the theorems that follow,
theorem 1 assumes that the set of potential immigrants is large enough that not all of them will
be accommodated by the city under study. This assumption allows me to avoid discussing trivial
equilibria with small numbers of immigrants. Theorem 1 also makes the simplifying assumption
that neither w − uθ nor w − uθ + δ are integers. The reason for this assumption is discussed below.
Proofs are presented in an appendix.
Theorem 1 Assume that neither w − uθ nor w − uθ + δ are integers and that n > w − uθ + δ. Then X∗
N
is a Nash equilibrium location proﬁle if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. All locations y ≤ y are occupied, where y = int(w − uθ).
2. All spaces y > y are vacant, where y = int(w − uθ + δ).
3. Alternate spaces are occupied in the region {y + 1,...,y}, with y + 1 vacant.
Theorem 1 establishes that the simultaneous arrival game has a unique equilibrium outcome
of the form illustrated in ﬁgure 1. An equilibrium development proﬁle consists of three regions.
An urban region near the old city limit which is solidly occupied, a more extreme suburban region
where only alternate spaces are occupied, and an unoccupied frontier. The intuition for this result
follows.
The urban region consists of locations sufﬁciently close to the core as to be more attractive
than an alternative city even when they have occupied neighbors. Thus, these locations must be
occupied by rational immigrants. The frontier consists of locations that are sufﬁciently remote that
they are less attractive than an alternative city even if they have no occupied neighbors. It follows
that these locations cannot be occupied by rational immigrants.
The suburbs are marginal urban land. Suburban locations are sufﬁciently remote that they
are only more attractive than an alternative city if they have no occupied neighbors. To see that
alternate spaces must be occupied in an equilibrium suburb, note that an immigrant at a suburban
location who does not obtain open space beneﬁts is strictly better off deviating to an alternate city,
so that no adjacent occupied spaces are possible in the suburbs. If two adjacent vacant spaces
occur in the suburbs, then the next most extreme immigrant can deviate and move closer to the
core without compromising his access to open space so that no adjacent open spaces are possible in
the suburbs. Since adjacent vacant and adjacent occupied locations are not possible in equilibrium
suburbs, it follows that alternate suburban locations are occupied.
6By inspection of theorem 1 and ﬁgure 1, we see that the location of the suburbs is determined
by the gap between the wage in the subject city and the utility of the alternate city, while the width
of the suburbs is determined entirely by the value of open space.
Figure 1 also makes clear the reason for assuming that neither w−uθ nor w−uθ +δ are integers.
If this condition is violated, the critical values of y where the bid-rent curves w − y and w − y + δ
are exactly equal to uθ coincide with lot locations. This raises the possibility that there will be two
locations in Y that are exactly indifferent, and hence the possibility of multiple equilibria. In fact,
absent this assumption multiple equilibria may arise, though each of them is very similar to the
unique equilibria that obtain in the rest of the parameter space. Thus, the object of the assumption
that neither w − uθ nor w − uθ + δ are integers is to simplify the statement of the theorem.
B. Simultaneous arrival game with a land market
Now consider a market for residential land that operates in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, all
landlords simultaneously choose prices. In the second stage all immigrants simultaneously choose
locations and pay the price associated with that location. All landlords whose locations are
ultimately unoccupied receive the price associated with the best alternative use of their land. The
two stage, ‘Bertrand’, operation of the land market allows immigrants an opportunity to respond
to a landlord’s price deviations. Without such an opportunity, unilateral price changes could not
have an effect on immigrant location choices.
Immigrants are restricted to choose pure strategies, so that a strategy for an immigrant is
a mapping from an observed price and location proﬁles into the set of possible locations, i.e.,
Si(P,X−i) ∈ Y
S
{θ}. Landlords are also restricted to choose pure strategies, so that a strategy for a
landlord is a mapping from the set of price proﬁles into the set of non-negative real numbers. That
is, Sy(P−y) = py. Let (P∗,X∗
N) denote a subgame perfect equilibrium choice of prices and locations
by landlords and immigrants.
Theorem 2 characterizes the unique location proﬁle and price gradient that result when immig-
rants play Nash equilibrium strategies, taking prices as given, and the landlords also play Nash
equilibrium strategies, correctly anticipating the immigrants’ responses, i.e., a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Like theorem 1, theorem 2 makes the simplifying assumption that neither w − uθ nor
w − uθ + δ are integers. Relaxing this assumption does not qualitatively change the results, but
does create the possibility of multiple equilibria. Like theorem 1, theorem 2 also supposes that
the set immigrants is large in order to avoid considering trivial equilibria that occur with small
numbers of agents.
Theorem 2 Assume that neither w − uθ nor w − uθ + δ are integers and that n > w − uθ + δ. A price
and location proﬁle (P∗,X∗
N) is an equilibrium if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. All locations y ≤ y are occupied, where y = int(w − uθ).
2. All spaces y > y are vacant, where y = int(w − uθ + δ).







w − uθ − y if y ≤ y
w − uθ − y + δ if y ∈ {y + 1,...,y} and y occupied
0 if y vacant.
Theorem 2 establishes that the simultaneous arrival game has a unique equilibrium outcome
of the form illustrated in ﬁgure 2. An equilibrium development proﬁle consists of three regions.
An urban region near the old city limit which is solidly occupied, a more extreme suburban region
where only alternate spaces are occupied, and an unoccupied frontier. The land price gradient
slopes down from the origin until the beginning of the suburbs, where it increases discretely to
δ − 2. In the suburbs, the land price gradient decreases with distance from one occupied space to
the next, but is zero at all unoccupied spaces. Depending on the magnitudes of δ and w, land prices
are highest at the least extreme urban location, y = 1, or at the least extreme occupied suburban
location, y = y + 2.
The location proﬁle described in theorem 2 is identical to the one described in theorem 1. The
introduction of a land market serves only to change the division of land rents. With a land market
all land rents are captured by landlords, while land rents are captured by immigrants when land
trades at its opportunity cost. The intuition behind theorem 2 is described below.
In the urban region an immigrant who occupied an urban location at a zero price would receive
land rents exactly equal to p∗
y, so that a landlord in this region who sets his price above p∗
y assures
that all immigrants prefer the alternate city to his location. Such a landlord is better off if he
deviates and chooses a small positive price in order to attract an immigrant. If a landlord chooses
a price below p∗
y he assures that his location is strictly more desirable than the alternate city and
hence that it is occupied in equilibrium. Such a landlord can deviate to a slightly higher price
without risk of his location being left vacant. Two possibilities remain, that an urban landlord
chooses price p∗
y and an immigrant chooses his location, or that an urban landlord chooses p∗
y
and his location goes unoccupied. Suppose a landlord chooses p∗
y and no immigrant chooses his
location. Then the landlord should deviate to a slightly lower price to attract an immigrant. The
only possibility remaining is that the urban landlord chooses p∗
y, and an immigrant occupies his
location. It follows that in equilibrium all urban locations must be occupied and the price must be
such that immigrants are indifferent between urban locations and the alternate city.
Next consider the frontier region. For any non-negative land price the alternate city is more
attractive to immigrants than any frontier location, even if the frontier location does not have
occupied neighbors. Thus, the only way that a landlord could attract an immigrant is to offer a
subsidy. This is not in the landlord’s interest and so equilibrium requires that all frontier locations
be unoccupied.
Finally, consider the suburban region. The suburb consists of locations where agents prefer the
alternate city to a suburban space with an occupied neighbor at any positive price. Thus adjacent
suburban spaces can only be occupied if landlords offer negative prices. Adjacent vacant spaces
are also not possible. If three adjacent spaces are vacant then the middle landlord can deviate to
a small positive price and attract an immigrant. Therefore, if two adjacent spaces are vacant, say
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Figure 2. A characteristic equilibrium location and price profile for the simultaneous ar-
rival game with a land market. Circles indicate vacant locations, discs indicate occupied
locations. Bars indicate the price at a given location. Rents vary with location so that
all immigrants are indifferent between their location and the alternate city.
y and y + 1, then y + 2 must be occupied. In this case, landlord y + 1 can deviate to any price
less than py+2 + 1 and provide the immigrant at y + 2 with an incentive to deviate to y + 1. Since
py+2 + 1 > 0 (as long as landlord y + 2 is not providing an irrational subsidy) such a deviation
is in landlord y + 1’s interest. Since adjacent vacant and adjacent occupied spaces are prohibited,
it follows that vacant and occupied spaces must alternate in equilibrium. Equilibrium prices are
set so that suburban immigrants are indifferent between the alternate city and the suburbs. The
intuition for this is the same as the intuition that leads prices in the urban region to adjust so that
immigrants are indifferent between the urban region and the alternate city.
As odd as it is, the equilibrium price gradient predicted by this model manages to correctly
reﬂect the value of both commuting costs and open space. However, the sharp jump up in land
prices at the boundary of the suburbs is in part an artifact of the model. If immigrants’ open space
beneﬁts increased continuously with the amount of nearby open space this effect would probably
be considerably smoothed. On the other hand, the fact of alternating zero and positive land prices
in the suburbs does not appear to be an artifact of simplifying assumptions.
To increase legibility, I earlier set the opportunity cost of land to zero. This means that immig-
rants are indifferent between buying vacant lots and not buying them, and the distinction between
public open space and private land becomes unclear. However all of the results presented here
persist, mutatis mutandis, with a strictly positive opportunity cost of land, so that this problem
should be regarded as following directly from simplifying assumptions, and not as a signal of
problems with the model.
C. Sequential arrival game with land market
Now consider the case when immigrants arrive sequentially rather than simultaneously. In period
1 landlords choose prices. During period 2, the n potential immigrants arrive sequentially and
either choose a location or move to a different city. In period 3, all immigrants ﬁnalize their
transactions and occupy their locations. Since an immigrant’s location choice during period 2
90
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Figure 3. A characteristic equilibrium location and price profile for the sequential
arrival game. Circles indicate vacant locations, discs indicate occupied locations.
Bars indicate land prices at a given locations. Land prices vary with location so that
all urban residents are indifferent between their location and the alternate city, but
suburban residents capture nearly all land rent.
is irrevocable, this model is consistent with a large implicit ﬁxed cost of moving and I imagine
immigrants in this game as purchasing rather than renting land.
Whilearrivaltimesareexplicitlymodeled, themodelisnotfullydynamicinthreeregards. First,
immigrants’ payoffs depend only on the ﬁnal arrangement of immigrants, so there is no incentive
to choose a more extreme location in order to secure a few periods without neighbors. Second,
landlords are indifferent between selling their parcel to the ﬁrst immigrant or to the last. These
two assumptions are consistent with examining the pattern of location choice over a time horizon
that is very short relative to the time that houses will be occupied. Third, landlords are constrained
not to adjust their prices as play progresses. This assumption does not affect the outcome of the
game and is relaxed in section 4. It is maintained here to simplify notation and exposition.
Like the immigrants of the simultaneous arrival game, immigrants in the sequential arrival
game derive utility from income, disutility from commuting, and, utility from their proximity to
open space. As before, i indexes the set of potential immigrants, but now also gives an immigrant’s
order of arrival. Thus, i(y) gives both the name and arrival time of the immigrant at location y. Let
Xi denote the set of occupied locations after all immigrants 1,...,i − 1 have moved. As before, XN
denotes a list of occupied locations after all n potential immigrants choose a location.
A strategy Si for immigrant i is a function from the set of possible location and price proﬁles at
i into the set of possible locations. That is, Si : (P,Xi) → Y
S
{θ}. SN denotes a strategy proﬁle for
all immigrants. Note that this imposes a mild restriction on immigrants’ behavior: immigrants are
permitted to condition only on the location proﬁle that they face, not on the history of play that
led to this proﬁle. This assumption requires that immigrants be unaware of the course of play that
precedes their arrival, and prevents immigrants from exploiting the repeated nature of the game.
Landlords are also restricted to choose pure strategies. A strategy for a landlord is a mapping
from the set of price proﬁles into the set of non-negative real numbers. That is, Sy(P−y) = py.
If no homeowner chooses a landlord’s location then the landlord receives the prevailing price in
the best non-residential land use. As before, this price is normalized to zero to increase legibility.
10SY denotes (Sy)m
y=1, a strategy proﬁle for all landlords. A strategy proﬁle for the game is a pair
(SY,SN), and an equilibrium proﬁle is denoted (S∗
Y,S∗
N). Theorem 3 now provides restrictive
necessary conditions for a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
Theorem 3 Assume that n > w − uθ + δ. Let y = int(w − uθ), and let t be the largest integer satisfying
2t < δ. Along any equilibrium path immigrants 1 to t occupy locations (y + 2,y + 4...,y + 2t). The
remaining immigrants occupy spaces 1,...,y or θ in any order.






w − y − uθ if y ∈ {1,...,y}
min(1,w − uθ + δ − y) if y ∈ {y + 2,y + 4,...,y + 2t}
0 else.
Theorem 3 establishes that any equilibrium of the sequential arrival game has an outcome of
the form illustrated in ﬁgure 3. As in the two earlier games, an equilibrium development proﬁle
consists of three regions. An urban region near the old city limit which is solidly occupied, a more
extreme suburban region where only alternate spaces are occupied, and an unoccupied frontier.
Land prices in the urban region adjust so that immigrants are indifferent between the target city
and the alternate city. In the suburban region the transaction price of an occupied lot is exactly
equal to one, except for the most extreme suburban location which may have a price less than one.
Unoccupied suburban lots have price zero. Finally, in any equilibrium of the sequential arrival
game, the ﬁrst immigrant occupies the ﬁrst suburban space, y + 2, the second immigrant occupies
the second suburban space, y + 4, and so on until alternate suburban locations are all occupied.
The remaining immigrants distribute themselves across the urban region and the alternate city in
any order.
Comparing the equilibria of the simultaneous arrival game with those of the sequential arrival
game we see that equilibrium patterns of location and urban land prices are identical, but that
suburbanlandpricesaredifferent. Inthesimultaneousarrivalgamelandpricesjumpupdiscretely
at the interior edge of the suburb (e.g., location y+2 in ﬁgure 2). This price jump does not occur in
the sequential arrival game. Finally, the sequential arrival game allows predictions about the order
in which locations are occupied. By construction, such results are not possible in the static game.
The main ideas in the proof of theorem 3 follow. As in the earlier results, the urban region
consists of those locations that an immigrant prefers to the alternative city at a non-negative price
even if the location has occupied neighbors. Similarly, the suburban region consists of those
locationsthatanimmigrantpreferstothealternativecityatanon-negativepriceonlyifthelocation
does not have occupied neighbors.
To begin, assume that equilibrium prices in the urban region are such that immigrants are
indifferent between the urban region and the alternate city. It follows that immigrant one is
indifferent between the alternate city and any urban space. Suppose that immigrant one occupies
y+k for k > 2 and pays price pk. It follows that no subsequent immigrant will occupy the adjacent
interior location y + k − 1 at any positive price and that this landlord receives zero payoff. The
landlord at location y + k − 1 can deviate to price, py+k−1 = py+k + α for α ∈ (0,1). Immigrant one
should respond by deviating to this location, leaving location y + k vacant and assuring landlord
11y + k a zero payoff. Since this competition from the adjacent less extreme landlord must occur at
every suburban location other than y + 2, where the next less extreme location is uninhabitable at
a non-negative price, it follows that the ﬁrst immigrant must choose y+2 if he chooses a suburban
location.
While the landlord at y + 2 does not face competition from the adjacent less extreme landlord,
he does face competition from the adjacent more extreme landlord. If landlord y + 2 chooses a
price greater than one, then landlord y + 3 can offer a low enough price to attract immigrant one.
It follows that if immigrant one occupies a suburban location, this suburban location is y + 2 and
the transaction price is one. Since the price of y + 2 is one, it follows that the immigrant retains
some of the land rent and strictly prefers this location to the alternate city or to the urban region.
Thus, immigrant one must occupy y+2. Similar logic assures that subsequent immigrants occupy
successive alternate suburban locations at low prices.
It remains to justify my initial assumption on urban land prices. Given that competition
amongst suburban landlords leads them to pass most land rent to the immigrants, urban land-
lords can only attract one of the early immigrants by outbidding the suburban landlord. On the
other hand, after the suburban locations are ﬁlled, the only competition for urban locations is the
alternate city. Since landlords are not impatient7 it makes sense for them to avoid competing with
the suburban landlords. In fact, after the suburban locations are occupied, the intuition underlying
the choice of urban land prices is the same as that which operates in the simultaneous arrival game.
The ﬁnding of low suburban land prices is interesting enough that a more heuristic explanation
is also justiﬁed. Suburban land is marginal urban land that is only valuable in residential use
if its neighbors are unoccupied. This means that adjacent landlords have powerful incentives to
compete, since only the landlord who attracts an immigrant ﬁrst will receive a positive payoff. In
this model, it is always the more central landlord who wins this competition since his location has
lower commute costs. This leads to the equilibrium described by theorem 3 where less remote
suburban locations are occupied ﬁrst and where suburban land prices reﬂect only the cost of
commuting a unit distance.
The low suburban land prices that occur in this model are striking because they describe a land
price gradient in which not all land rent accrues to landlords in equilibrium. This is a peculiar
characteristic for an equilibrium location pattern, and my intuition is that it should be relevant the
very ﬁrst time that a land transaction will lead to development, e.g., the sale of a lot, and hence
commits the neighborhood to a pattern of residential location. Subsequent sales of the location
(which are not modeled here) occur after development patterns are set and should not be expected
to conform to the predictions of theorem 3.
The low transaction prices of suburban land come about because suburban landlords compete
to attract immigrants before their neighbors do. In this model, landlords are only able to compete
by lowering the asking price of their lots. In practice, we should expect to see other responses
to this problem, e.g., preemptive building in advance of demand, or the development of larger
parcels. Thus, the ﬁnding in theorem 3 that suburban land prices are low, is interesting because it
7It is important that landlords are not impatient. Otherwise they would have an incentive to cut their prices to attract
an earlier immigrant. As we will see later, this complicates matters considerably.
12is a symptom of an underlying incentive problem. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it
is clearly of interest to consider responses to this problem other than price competition.
A consequence of low suburban land prices is that not all immigrants have the same utility level
in an equilibrium city. This is of considerable interest. A nearly universal assumption in theoretical
analyses of cities is that all city residents obtain the same level of utility in equilibrium.8 The
current contradictory ﬁnding suggests the need to revisit existing theoretical models of location
choice in the presence of landscape externalities.
Since an immigrant actually ‘moves in’ after all immigrants have chosen a location, the move
order has no welfare consequences in this game. Nevertheless, the order of play is noteworthy.
In any equilibrium, immigrant one occupies the nearest suburban location, while subsequent
immigrants occupy progressively more remote suburban locations. After the suburban region
is ‘full’, successive immigrants occupy urban locations in any order. The ﬁnding that suburbs are
occupiedbeforeinteriorlocationsforeshadowsa similarresultinafullydynamicmodel. However,
in the dynamic model, such large scale ’leapfrogging’ will have important welfare implications.
D. The optimal static city
For a given location proﬁle XN, I now let χ(y,XN) be an indicator variable that is zero if location y
has a neighbor in location proﬁle XN, and one if it does not. Deﬁne the social surplus of location
proﬁle XN to be
W(XN) = Σy∈XN(w − y + χ(y,XN)δ − uθ). (2)
That is, W(XN) is the most that the potential immigrants would pay, in aggregate, for the oppor-
tunity to settle in the subject city. An optimal location proﬁle, X∗∗
N , is the one that maximizes this
surplus, i.e., X∗∗
N solves maxXN⊂Y W(XN).
Theorem 4 characterizes the unique optimal location proﬁle for the three static location games
already analyzed. As before I exclude from consideration economies where w − y − δ or w − y + δ
are integers or where the number of potential immigrants is small.
Theorem 4 Suppose that w − y − δ and w − y + δ are not integers and that n > w − uθ + δ. Then there
is a unique optimal location proﬁle, X∗∗, and this proﬁle satisﬁes the following three conditions:
1. All y ≤ y∗∗ are occupied, where y∗∗ = int(w − uθ − δ).
2. All y > y are vacant, where y = int(w − uθ + δ).
3. Alternate locations are occupied in the set {y∗∗,...,y}.
Theorem 4 establishes that the unique optimal location proﬁle is of the form illustrated in ﬁgure
4. An optimal city consists of three regions. An urban region near the old city limit which is
solidly occupied, a more extreme suburban region where only alternate spaces are occupied, and
8D. E. Wildasin [35] gives conditions under which a utilitarian planner’s optimum need not result in equal utility
levels for identical agents living in a monocentric city. This is different from the current result where unequal utility
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Figure 4. A characteristic optimal location profile. Discs indicate occupied locations.
Circles indicate vacant locations under efficient and optimal locations. Triangles
indicate locations which are vacant in the optimal but not the equilibrium outcome.
anunoccupiedfrontier. Thatis, anoptimalcityhasthesameformastheequilibriumcitythatarises
under each of the land markets considered so far. Moreover, the suburban/frontier boundary is
the same in the optimal and equilibrium cities. The optimal city differs from the equilibrium only
in the location of the urban/suburban boundary. In an optimal city, this boundary occurs about δ
locations nearer to the core than in an equilibrium city. Thus, the optimal suburb is larger than an
equilibrium suburb, and the optimal urban region is smaller. Equilibrium cities are too populous
and too dense.
To understand this result, note that preferences over open space lead naturally to ’landscape
externalities’. When immigrants have a taste for open space, if immigrant A locates next to
immigrant B, then immigrant A imposes a cost on B by depriving him of what was previously
open space. In the context of ﬁgure 4, this means that (given the choice) an immigrant in the
alternative city would move to the least remote vacant space since doing so results in a utility
level strictly greater than uθ. However, if the immigrant occupying this location were required
to compensate his neighbors for their resulting loss of open space, such a move would cease to be
attractive. Thus, we see in ﬁgure 4, that the suburbs optimally begin when locations are sufﬁciently
remote that w − y − δ < uθ. In equilibrium, the suburbs begin further out, where w − y < uθ and
the private beneﬁts of proximity are all that is considered.
Theorem 4 and ﬁgure 4 show that equilibrium cities are too populous and too dense. The
natural policy response to this is to create parks near the urban/suburban boundary, at locations
that should optimally be left open, i.e., the triangles in ﬁgure 4. It is easy to see that creating such a
series of parks leads to an equilibrium city which coincides with the optimum in the simultaneous
or sequential arrival game. Conversely, a policy which provides incentives for inﬁll development
of vacant locations near the equilibrium urban/suburban border is welfare decreasing.
This analysis also suggests that the creation of ‘greenbelts’ by prohibiting development in wide
regions of the suburbs, will not be welfare improving. When a greenbelt prevents immigrants from
locating in an extreme portion of the suburbs, these immigrants are displaced to another city, and
they (or the owners of the now unoccupied locations) are worse off. Since there is no beneﬁt to the
remaining immigrants from the creation of a large vacant region at the city’s edge, such greenbelts
14are welfare decreasing. This result should probably be taken literally: A taste for nearby open
space does not lead to a policy of green belts. Other sorts of externalities or preferences can lead to
such policies, e.g., J. K. Brueckner [32].
4. Dynamic model
A. Dynamic game of residential location
Now consider the fully dynamic n period game. In each period, landlords ﬁrst simultaneously
choose prices. After landlords name prices, an immigrant arrives, selects, pays for, and occupies
a location. This game differs from the static game with sequential arrival in that landlords are
impatientandthecourseofplaycanaffectimmigrantpayoffs. Asinthestaticgamewithsequential
arrival, the fully dynamic game should be regarded as describing only the transactions which
determine the pattern of development, e.g., the sale of a lot.
As before, I consider a city which has just experienced a wage shock. Y = {1,...,m} denotes the
set of available locations, and y ∈ Y a particular location. The land at each location is owned by a
landlord, each of whom owns exactly one location. Index landlords by y ∈ Y where a landlord’s
name also gives the location of his parcel.
The set of potential immigrants is N = {1,...,n}. Immigrant 1 arrives in period 1, immigrant 2
arrives in period 2, and immigrant i arrives in period i. Upon arrival potential immigrants choose
a location in Y or go to another city θ. As before, immigrant i’s choice of location is yi ∈ Y
S
{θ}
and i(y) denotes the immigrant(s) occupying location y, with i(y) = φ if y is unoccupied.
Let Xi denote the set of occupied locations after immigrants 1,...,i −1 have moved, so that X1 =
φ, and Xn is observed by the last immigrant to arrive. Call Xi a location proﬁle at time i. XN
denotes a location proﬁle for the game, a list of occupied locations after all n potential immigrants
have made their choice of location.
Landlords choose an asking price in each period and are restricted to choose pure strategies. Let
pi
y be a choice of asking price for landlord y for period i, Pi ∈ Rm
+ an asking price proﬁle for period
i, and, Pi
−y = Pi/py a choice of asking prices for all landlords but y in period i. Note that landlords
name n prices over the course of the game, so it is necessary to distinguish between transaction
prices and asking prices.9
Immigrant i’s strategy speciﬁes a choice of location depending on the available vacant locations
and the current proﬁle of asking prices. Thus, a strategy for immigrant i is a mapping,
Si : (Pi,Xi) −→ Y
[
{θ}.
A landlord’s strategy speciﬁes a price in each period, depending on the available locations in the
period, and the current proﬁle of asking prices by other landlords. A landlord’s strategy may also




9To simplify notation, landlords continue to name prices in periods after their location is occupied. However, these
prices are irrelevant to the play of the game since no location is ever occupied by two immigrants.
15Thus, a strategy Sy for landlord y is a sequence Sy = (St
y)n
t=1 of such mappings, one for each
period. A strategy proﬁle for all landlords is denoted SY, a strategy proﬁle for the game, by the
pair, (SY,SN), and a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy proﬁle by (S∗
Y,S∗
N).
Agents are constrained to choose pure strategies. Agents are also required to condition only on
the location proﬁle and asking price proﬁle that they face and not on the course of play that leads
to it. Essentially this is a requirement that landlords have no memory, and that immigrants have no
information about the course of play that precedes their arrival. The object of these assumptions is
to prohibit players from employing strategies which take advantage of the repeated nature of the
game. In a game with large numbers of players, like the one envisioned here, these are intuitive
restrictions.
Starting with the period when they arrive in the city, an immigrant’s utility in each period
is given by equation 1, and immigrants discount future utility with discount factor γ ∈ (0,1).
Deﬁne kN(y,Xi,SY,SN) to be the number of periods until an immigrant locating at y in period i has
a neighbor, given that he faces location proﬁle Xi and immigrant and landlord strategy proﬁles
(SY,SN). Then an immigrant’s utility is,
Ui(yi,kN) = Σ
kN−1
t=0 γt(w − yi + δ) + Σ∞
t=kNγt(w − yi) − pi
y
= 1
1−γ(w − yi − (1− γkN)δ) − pi
y.
(3)
Note that this formulation of preferences treats land prices as an asset price rather than a rental
price. This is consistent with the notion that location choices in this game correspond to house or
lot purchases.
Landlords maximize the discounted present value of the sale of their land, taking the start of
the game as time zero. Let kY(y,Xi,SY,SN) be the number of periods until location y is occupied,
when a landlord faces location proﬁle Xi and price proﬁles and location decisions are determined
by strategies SN and SY. A landlord’s payoff is given by Πy = γkYpy.
Theorem 5 provides necessary conditions for an equilibrium of the dynamic residential location
game.
Theorem 5 Let y = int(w − (1− γ)uθ + δ) and y = int(w − (1− γ)uθ). If n > y then any equilibrium
of the dynamic game satisﬁes:
1. In any equilibrium location proﬁle X∗
N all spaces y > y are vacant.
2. In any equilibrium location proﬁle X∗
N all locations y ≤ y are occupied, and they are occupied before
any immigrant chooses θ.
3. Before any immigrant chooses θ alternate spaces are occupied in the region {y + 1,...,y}, with y + 2
occupied ﬁrst and progressively more extreme alternate locations occupied in sequence.
Theorem 5 states that after play is complete an equilibrium location proﬁle has the same form
in the dynamic game as it has in the static games with three minor changes. First, (1 − γ)uθ
replaces uθ in the deﬁnitions of y and y. This is simply the conversion of a lump sum into a stream:
Σ∞
t=0γt((1 − γ)uθ) = uθ. Second, theorem 5 is weaker than the corresponding theorem for the
sequential arrival game (theorem 3), in that it does not require that suburban spaces be occupied
16before urban spaces. Rather it requires that less remote suburban spaces be occupied before more
remote suburban spaces. Unlike the patient landlords of the static game with sequential arrival,
impatient urban landlords may be unwilling to wait until all suburban locations are occupied
before attracting an immigrant, so that urban locations may be occupied before the suburbs are
full. Third, theorem 5 requires that no immigrant choose θ until the city is full. In the dynamic
game, landlords are impatient to have their locations occupied. Should any immigrant choose θ
before a desirable location was ﬁlled, that landlord has an incentive to bid down the land price
until the wayward immigrant comes back to the subject city. This is not a requirement of theorem
3, since a landlord in the sequential arrival game is indifferent about which immigrant occupies
his location.
Theorem 6 provides necessary conditions that must be satisﬁed by suburban transaction prices
in any equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Theorem 6 Let y = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ + δ) and y = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ). If n > y, then in any
equilibrium of the dynamic game, if immigrant i chooses location y ∈ {y,...,y} then pi
y ≤ 1
1−γ.
Theorem 6 establishes that, while landlords may ask other prices during periods when their
location does not trade hands, in any period when an immigrant buys a suburban location, the
transaction price can be no greater than the discount present value of a one unit increase in
commuting distance. The intuition underlying this result is identical to that which leads to low
suburban land prices in the static game with sequential arrival. Suburban locations transact at low
prices because landlords must compete with neighboring landlords in order to attract a resident
and avoid being left with a vacant location at the end of the game.
A comment about the structure of the land market is appropriate here. By assumption, only
one immigrant is permitted to purchase land in each period. For example, in period two only
immigrant two may purchase a lot (or choose the alternate city), immigrant one is prohibited from
changing his location even if such a change is desirable. Two justiﬁcations for this prohibition of
relocation are possible. First, the transactions costs associated with buying and selling residential
real estate are large. Imagining that these costs are large enough to prohibit moving is a reasonable,
though coarse, approximation to the barrier that transactions costs impose on a potential mover.
Alternately, the restriction on relocation may be regarded purely as a simplifying assumption. In
this case it is interesting to consider what would happen if we were to relax the restriction and
allow all immigrants to relocate in each period. Although a proof is beyond the scope of this
paper, I conjecture that relaxing this assumption would have no effect at all on patterns of location
or on transaction prices for previously unoccupied lots.10 11
10This conjecture is based on the following observation. When immigrants are permitted to relocate they essentially
assume the role of landlords in the periods after they ﬁrst locate in the city. This transforms the dynamic game into a
sequence of games that look like the static game with simultaneous arrival, save that each successive game involves one
more player. Once such a game becomes large enough that the suburban locations are being occupied, each successive
period will see one more suburban location occupied at the previous suburban frontier. Since these spaces are at the
very edge of the city the next more remote location remains unoccupied, so that these locations cannot command a
price greater that the cost of commuting to this next more remote location. This will lead to a ﬁnal location pattern and
suburban land transaction prices that are consistent with theorems 5 and 6.
11It is worth pointing out that theorem 6 places restrictions only on the prices at which transactions occur in the period
when the transactions occur. This is subtly different from a rent gradient. In this model, a rent gradient would consist
of prices for each location in a particular time.
17Theorem 5 gives necessary conditions for the ﬁnal location proﬁle resulting from subgame
perfect equilibrium play of the dynamic game. Theorem 6 gives necessary conditions for suburban
land transaction prices resulting from equilibrium play. Neither theorem sheds any light on the
order in which locations are occupied. Theorem 7 provides additional necessary conditions which
restrict the order in which locations are occupied in any equilibrium play of the dynamic game.
Theorem 7 Let y = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ) and l ∈ {0,...,y} an integer. Suppose n > w − (1 − γ)uθ + δ
and δ > l
γn. Then, in any equilibrium, all y ∈ {y − l,...,y} are occupied after the ﬁrst suburban location,
y + 2, is occupied.
Theorem 7 provides a partial characterization of the order in which locations are occupied. In
particular, it gives conditions under which the ﬁrst suburban location must be occupied before
the l most extreme urban locations. These conditions are that the set of immigrants is sufﬁciently
large that all urban locations are occupied at the end of the game and that the value of open space
is larger than the discount present value of commuting a unit distance during the n periods of
the game. Note that theorem 7 makes a stronger statement than that development and vacant
locations will alternate in the suburbs. In addition to the alternate vacant spaces that persist in
the ﬁnal arrangement of the suburbs, early immigrants may locate at relatively remote locations,
’leapfrogging’ over many undeveloped locations in the process.
The intuition behind theorem 7 is nearly identical to that which explains why the suburbs must
be occupied in advance of the urban region in the static game with sequential arrival. Given
theorem 6, an immigrant who locates at the interior edge of the suburb pays a low price, and
thereby captures most of the land rent due to this location. Slightly less extreme urban landlords
do not need to compete for immigrants who want these attractive locations since they are assured
that, eventually, an immigrant will buy their location. Thus, immigrants at these locations do not
capture as much land rent. It follows that suburban locations may be more attractive to immigrants
than are slightly less extreme urban locations and hence may be occupied earlier. Unlike the static
game with sequential arrival, however, urban landlords are impatient and it remains possible that
an urban landlord will want to attract an immigrant before all of the suburban locations are ﬁlled.
Thus, theorem 7 is consistent with (but does not guarantee) a sequence of location choices in
which the urban region develops continuously out from the city center while the suburban region
simultaneously develops in alternate location outward from the ﬁnal urban/suburban frontier.
This sequence of location choices would leave a large undeveloped gap between the urban and
suburban regions that is not ﬁlled until late in the development process.
B. The optimal dynamic city
To construct a measure of dynamic optimality, I apply the static notion in each period and then
discount each period’s welfare back to the beginning of the game. In each period of play the
surplus generated by the dynamic city is the same as would be generated by the corresponding
static city with location proﬁle Xi, i.e., equation 2. Thus,
W(Xi) = Σy∈Xi [w − y − χ(y,Xi)δ − (1− γ)uθ].




An optimal dynamic city is a sequence of feasible location proﬁles (Xi)i∈{1,...,n,N} that maximizes
WN.
Given this deﬁnition, theorems 8 and 9 provide two necessary conditions for an optimal dy-
namic city.
Theorem 8 Let y∗∗ = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ − δ). If (X∗∗
i )i∈{1,...,n,N} is an optimal sequence of location
proﬁles and δ > 1, then for all i no two adjacent locations more extreme than y∗∗ are occupied in X∗∗
i .
Like the corresponding theorem for the static game, theorem 4, theorem 8 requires that an
optimal city contain empty spaces closer to the core than are present in an equilibrium city. As
in the static game, immigrants fail to take account of the costs that they impose on their neighbors
when they occupy a vacant location. Thus, like its static counterpart, an equilibrium city resulting
from the dynamic location game does not contain enough open space.
In the dynamic game, landlords care about when they sell their land, and immigrants care about
the number of periods that they are without neighbors. This opens the door to the possibility, not
only that the ﬁnal arrangement of immigrants will be sub-optimal, but that the order in which
immigrants ﬁll a certain location proﬁle may also be inefﬁcient. Theorem 9 provides a condition
that must be satisﬁed if such dynamic inefﬁciency is to be avoided.
Theorem 9 Let X∗∗
N be a socially optimal location proﬁle. Let y and y0 be two occupied locations in this
proﬁle such that y0 > y, and, neither y nor y0 has neighbors. Then y is occupied before y0.
The intuition behind this result is simple. A less remote location without neighbors generates
more surplus than does a corresponding more remote location. It is easy to see in equation 4 that
occupying spaces with more surplus sooner rather than later will lead to higher welfare. It follows
that less remote spaces without neighbors must be occupied before more remote locations without
neighbors.
We can now see that equilibria of the dynamic game may be dynamically inefﬁcient. From
theorem 7, we know that large scale leapfrogging can occur in equilibrium. Moreover, from
theorem 8, some of the locations that are passed over, should optimally be occupied and not
have neighbors. Therefore, in the dynamic game an equilibrium development path may deviate
from the optimum both because it fails to provide enough interior open space, but also because
suburban locations are developed earlier than they should be.
Thus equilibrium deviation from the optimum is more nuanced in the dynamic model than
in the static models. In the static models, equilibrium cities contain too many people to close
together. That is, the static models are ’not sprawling enough’. In the dynamic model, the same
statement is true for the ﬁnal location proﬁle, but under the conditions of theorem 7, leapfrog
development leads the dynamic city to diverge from the optimal development path. That is, the
ﬁnal development proﬁle will not be sprawling enough, but along the path to this ﬁnal proﬁle the
city may be too sprawling. In light of this more nuanced welfare analysis, policy prescriptions
from the dynamic model are also more nuanced.
19As in the static model, the creation of small parks slightly less extreme that the ﬁnal
urban/suburban border continues to be welfare improving, policies which promote inﬁlling of
vacant locations slightly more extreme than the ﬁnal urban/suburban border are still not welfare
improving, and, permanent greenbelts that restrict the size of the ﬁnal location proﬁle are still
not welfare improving. However, the dynamic model suggests a reﬁnement of these recom-
mendations. The static model indicates that creating small parks in the urban region near the
urban/suburban border is welfare improving. The dynamic model suggests that these parks
shouldbecreatedinadvanceofimmigration, andthattheyshouldbemoreextensive. Inparticular,
analysis of the dynamic model suggests that creating a network of small parks that extends from
the urban region near the urban suburban boundary all the way out to the frontier is welfare
improving.
In the dynamic model, suburban landlords compete with each other to attract immigrants, so
that in equilibrium, most of the rent associated with these locations is captured by the immigrant.
As a consequence, these suburban locations are very attractive to immigrants and are occupied
sooner than they would be in the optimum. If parks were created at alternate suburban locations,
then suburban landlords would no longer need to compete with their neighbors to attract immig-
rants, and would consequently choose prices such that they, rather than the immigrants, capture
the land rents at these locations. This would remove the incentive for immigrants ’leapfrog’ and
move to the suburbs before more interior locations were ﬁlled.
An alternate, somewhat coarser strategy is also reasonable. By prohibiting development in
outlying areas until the interior is developed at suburban densities, a series of temporary greenbelts
could also prevent welfare decreasing leapfrogging. The distinction between such temporary
green belts and permanent greenbelts is important. Permanent green belts serve to restrict the
ﬁnal conﬁguration of the city, temporary green belts restrict leapfrog development and require
that a city develop outward at a more uniform density.
5. Private open space
It is natural to imagine that a big privately owned yard serves its owner as a substitute for nearby
public open space. Moreover, people do choose to have yards of different sizes. Thus, I would like
to consider patterns of residential location in an environment where people have tastes for public
and private open space, and choose both their lot size and their location.
As a ﬁrst step, we must specify preferences over public and private open space. Any such
preferences must deal with two possible types of substitution. First, the substitution of a larger
private yard for oneself, for public open space. Second, the substitution of a larger private yard for
a neighbor for public open space.12 While the empirical literature does provide a basis for thinking
about the relationship between the value of own yard size and the value of nearby public land, to
12J. K. Brueckner [36] is also concerned with the extent to which yards should be regarded as public or private goods,
but does not consider the possibility that people may derive beneﬁts from a neighbor’s yard.
20my knowledge, this literature has not considered the substitution between public open space and
larger yards for one’s neighbors.13
To analyze residential location choices in this complicated environment, I suppose that nearby
public open space is a perfect substitute for one’s own private open space, and that a neighbor’s
private open space is of no value. That is, I imagine that all private open space is surrounded by
tall fences, and that these fences prevent neighbors from deriving beneﬁt from the space, but not
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w − yi − py + δ
if yi is vacant and has no
occupied neighbors
w − yi − (py−1 + py + py+1) + δ if yi − 1,yi,yi+1 are vacant and i buys them
w − yi − py
if yi is vacant and has at least one
occupied neighbor
−∞ if yi is occupied by another immigrant
uθ if yi = θ.
(5)
This speciﬁcation is identical to those given earlier in equation 1, with two exceptions. First, there
is the possibility of purchasing three adjacent lots in order to obtain open space beneﬁts. Second,
’occupied neighbor’ is either an adjacent residence or an adjacent private open space.
Suppose that all other aspects of the static game with simultaneous arrival and a land market
are preserved (see section 3b), except that the opportunity cost of land is strictly positive. It is now
easy to show that the equilibria in this more general game are exactly the same as those in the
original game where private open space is exogenously prohibited.
To see this, note that no equilibrium is possible in which an immigrant owns private land. Any
immigrant who secures open space by purchasing it is strictly better off deviating to the strategy
where he purchases only the location he occupies. In a Nash equilibrium, no other immigrant
can respond to this deviation by occupying the newly available spaces, so that they must remain
open, and our immigrant enjoys the beneﬁts of open space without paying for the adjacent lot.
It follows that no rational landlord will sell land to an immigrant unless the immigrant is going
to occupy that location. Since the purchase of open space cannot occur in equilibrium, we are, in
effect, returned to the original game and the resulting equilibria are described by theorem 2.
This ﬁnding is simultaneously reassuring and disturbing. The result is reassuring because it
means that the equilibria of the simultaneous move game are robust to the possibility of endo-
genous lot size. Put another way, the ﬁnding that equilibria of the static game are robust to the
possibility of private open space means that these equilibria are not sensitive to the ﬁxed lot size
assumption. Indeed, whiletheassumptionofﬁxeddiscretelotsisastrongsimplifyingassumption,
theintuitionunderlyingresultspresentedhereshouldpersistinmoregeneralmodels. Equilibrium
location patterns presented here are driven by the fact that when people like to be near open space,
13This may seem like a purely academic detail, but it is actually an important issue. If I am indifferent between having
land preserved as open space in a park, and having it preserved as open space in my neighbor’s back yard, then zoning
for public open space and zoning for small houses on large lots is equivalent.
21some land is sufﬁciently far away from the center that it is only valuable in residential use if nearby
parcels are unoccupied. This basic intuition should persist in more complex environments than
those treated here.
On the other hand, the ﬁnding of no equilibrium provision of private open space is disturbing
because the result looks like an artifact of the equilibrium concept employed. The natural response
to this problem is to investigate the provision of private open space using one of the other sorts
of equilibria. Unfortunately, despite considerable effort, this problem has resisted solution. While
I conjecture that a similar result obtains in the static game with sequential arrival, a compelling
proof is elusive.14
The ﬁnding of no equilibrium provision of private open space is also disturbing because it is
counterfactual. Different lot sizes are observed, but are not predicted by this model. This suggests
a problem with the model. However, given the deliberate simplicity of the model, it should come
as no surprise that it fails to predict all aspects of observed development patterns. I conjecture that
one of two generalizations could result in equilibria with private provision of open space. The ﬁrst
such generalization would involve the introduction of two classes of agents, wealthy agents with
a high cost of commuting and poor agents with a low cost of commuting. Alternately, allowing
private open space to be strictly more valuable to its owner than the corresponding amount of
public open space might also lead to equilibria with the private provision of open space. These
models are the subject of further research.
6. A back of the envelope calculation
In all of the equilibria analyzed here the value of open space, δ, corresponds closely to the extent
of the suburbs. Therefore, if we can estimate this parameter, we can get a sense for the economic
importance of landscape preferences and for the amount of observed open space they can explain.
Since the analysis has taken unit commuting costs to be the numeraire, estimating δ requires an
estimate of both of the value of open space and of marginal commuting costs.
While a number of studies provide estimates of the value of access to open space, the estimates
presented in E. G. Irwin [12] are best suited to the current purpose. Estimates obtained in P.
Cheshire and S. Sheppard [37], while not directly comparable, appear to be of a similar magnitude.
Using data on house sales in suburban Maryland, E. G. Irwin [12] estimates that in 1995 converting
an average acre of pasture land to residential development, anywhere within a 400m radius of an
average house will decrease the house’s value by about 1530 dollars. Abusing the marginal nature
of this analysis, I calculate that the value of moving from a neighborhood with no open space to
14The intuition behind this conjecture is as follows. First, one can show that in any equilibrium, the bid rent curve
for immigrants who purchase private land must be one third as steep as the bid rent curves for individuals purchasing
only one location. Second, one can also show that in any equilibrium all private open space must be less extreme than
all public open space. I conjecture that there is no way to satisfy these conditions in a way that involves any positive
amount of private open space.
22a neighborhood, which is half occupied (like those in this paper) at about 4752 dollars per year.15
If a commuter makes 500 one way trips per year, and the marginal cost of a mile of driving is c
then δ = 4752/500c = 9.50/c. Thus, even if we assign quite high values to the marginal cost
of commuting, resulting estimates of δ are consistent with low density suburbs whose extent is
measured in miles or tens of miles. This suggests that open space preferences are probably ’strong
enough’ to explain a large portion of observed open space.
7. Conclusions
The results developed here have important implications for the further study of land use. While
equilibrium land prices in the static model do reﬂect the value of open space, equilibrium land
prices in the dynamic model and the model with sequential arrival do not. Therefore, hedonic
analyses of housing prices which estimate the value of access to open space are reasonable only if
the simultaneous arrival game is true. This is a surprising result, and my intuition is that it applies
only to those land transactions which set the patterns of development that are to be followed by
future development.
The model and results presented here also have important implications for further theoretical
analyses. In models where migration is possible, an equilibrium is often deﬁned to occur only
when prices have adjusted so that all residents are indifferent between their chosen location and
a reservation utility level associated with migration. In the game with sequential arrival and in
the dynamic game, we see that this need not be a property of equilibrium. This suggests that this
common approach to modeling cities must be used with care if it is to yield useful insights about
the implications of landscape preferences.
Preferences for open space naturally give rise to negative landscape externalities, as people do
not account for the cost they impose on their neighbors by altering the landscape. The policy
response to such externalities is to create open space in densely populated regions of the city at the
urban/suburban boundary. This result appears to be robust to general speciﬁcations of landscape
preferences: If people derive utility from proximity to open space, then landscape externalities will
surely arise, and increases in Benthamite welfare measures will surely be larger when open space
is created in densely populated rather than in sparsely populated areas. Conversely, a policy of
"inﬁlling" vacant locations near the urban/surban boundary will not be welfare improving.
The results presented here also suggest that creating parks in undeveloped areas before they are
subject to development pressures will reduce leapfrogging development. Intuitively, this seems
reasonable. Such parks could reduce the competition between landlords and hence reduce the
incentives for immigrants to locate in remote low density areas.
15A disc of radius 400m has an area of 4002πm2 = 502,660m2, or 50.3 hectares. There are 2.47 acres per hectare, so
that a disc of radius 400m has an area of 50.3 × 2.47 = 124.24 hectares. Moving from a neighborhood of zero open
space to a neighborhood with 50% open space requires that the number of acres of open space with 400m of the house
increase from zero to 124.24/2 = 62.12 acres. From E. G. Irwin [12], each acre of additional open space increases the a
house’s value by 1530 dollars, so moving from a neighborhood with no open space to a neighborhood with 50% open
space increases the value of a house by 62.12×1530 = 95044 dollars. Converting this to a ﬂow using a 5% discount rate
suggests that the annual value of the ﬂow of open space services is 95044/20 = 4752 dollars per year.
23The results presented here also suggest that policy makers should regard greenbelts with cau-
tion. If such green belts are sufﬁciently durable they have the potential to constrain the shape of
the city in a way that is welfare decreasing (absent other features in the economy which might
make them desirable). On the other hand, if greenbelts are allowed to migrate outward as the
interior ﬁlls up to suburban densities, then they can serve to prohibit socially inefﬁcient leapfrog
development without constraining the ﬁnal layout of the city.
More generally, these results suggest that a world with landscape externalities requires a much
more active government than economists often consider in this context. Simply imposing conges-
tion taxes and getting property taxes right is not enough. Regulation or taxes which affect the
micro-structure of urban landscapes is necessary for an optimal outcome.
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8. Proofs:
Theorem 1 Assume that neither w − uθ nor w − uθ + δ are integers and that n > w − uθ + δ. Then X∗
N
is a Nash equilibrium location proﬁle if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. All locations y ≤ y are occupied, where y = int(w − uθ).
2. All spaces y > y are vacant, where y = int(w − uθ + δ).
3. Alternate spaces are occupied in the region {y + 1,...,y}, with y + 1 vacant.
Proof: Let S∗ be an equilibrium and X∗ an equilibrium outcome.
No location greater than y can be occupied in equilibrium. Even if such a location has no
neighbors, an immigrant is better off choosing θ. Since n > int(w − uθ + δ) = y, it follows that, in
equilibrium, some immigrant must choose θ.
Suppose that y ≤ y is vacant and Si = θ. If i deviates to y, then ui(y,0,X−i) ≥ w − y =
w −int(w − uθ) > w − (w − uθ) = uθ. Therefore, if X∗ is an equilibrium location proﬁle, (1) holds.
Now suppose that y > y is occupied. Since y and y are integers, it follows that y ≥ y + 1. Thus,
ui(y)(y,0,X−i(y)) ≤ w − (y + 1) + δ = w − int(w − uθ + δ) − 1 + δ < uθ. Therefore, if X∗ is an
equilibrium, then (2) holds.
Suppose that y ∈ {y + 1,...,y}. Say that y has at least one neighbor and is occupied. Then
ui(y)(y,0,X−i(y)) = w − y ≤ w − (y + 1) < uθ. It follows that no occupied space in {y + 1,...,y} has
a neighbor. Now suppose that y ∈ {y + 1,...,y}, is unoccupied, and has no neighbors. If Si = θ,
then player i can deviate to location y and get payoff ui(y,X−i) = w − y + δ ≥ w − y + δ > uθ. It
follows that if X∗ is an equilibrium location proﬁle then every unoccupied location in {y + 1,...,y}
has at least one occupied neighbor. Now suppose that y,y + 1 ∈ {y + 1,...,y} are both unoccupied.
We have justshown that y+2must beoccupied. But i(y+2) can deviate to i(y+1) and beoneunit
distance closer to the city center and still not have neighbors. Therefore, i(y +2) should deviate to
26i(y+1). Thus, if X∗ is an equilibrium location proﬁle then there are no two adjacent vacant spaces
in {y + 1,...,y}. It follows that (3) holds for all equilibrium location proﬁles.
Now let X∗ be a location proﬁle satisfying the conditions of the theorem. By construction, all
vacant spaces provide a payoff of less than uθ, while all occupied spaces provide a payoff of at
least uθ. It follows that no deviation is rational. Hence, X∗ must be an equilibrium. 
Theorem 2 Assume that neither w − uθ nor w − uθ + δ are integers and that n > w − uθ + δ. A price
and location proﬁle (P∗,X∗
N) is an equilibrium if and only if the following conditions hold:
1. All locations y ≤ y are occupied, where y = int(w − uθ).
2. All spaces y > y are vacant, where y = int(w − uθ + δ).







w − uθ − y if y ≤ y
w − uθ − y + δ if y ∈ {y + 1,...,y} and y occupied
0 if y vacant.
Proof: Let (P∗,S∗) be an equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
No location greater than y can be occupied in equilibrium. Even if such a location has no
neighbors and py = 0, an immigrant is better off choosing θ. Since n > int(w − uθ + δ) = y, it
follows that in equilibrium some immigrant must choose θ.
Say y ≤ y vacant and Si = θ. By hypothesis, the interval (0,w − y − uθ) is not empty. Say
landlord y chooses py ∈ (0,w − y − uθ). Then player i’s payoff at y is ui(y,py,X−i) ≥ w − y − py >
w−y−(w−y−uθ) = uθ. It follows that i’s best response to landlord y’s deviation is to move to y.
Since py > 0 this deviation is also in landlord y’s interest. It follows that if (P∗,X∗) an equilibrium,
then (1) holds.
Say y > y is occupied. Since, y and y are integers, y ≥ y + 1. Thus, ui(y)(y,p∗
y,X∗
−i) = w −
(y + 1) − p∗
y + δ < uθ − p∗
y ≤ uθ. It follows that immigrant i(y) should deviate to θ. Therefore, if
(P∗,X∗) is an equilibrium, (2) holds.
Suppose y ∈ {y + 1,...,y} and has a neighbor. Then ui(y)(y,p∗
y,X∗
−i) = w − y − p∗
y ≤ w − y ≤
w − (y + 1) < uθ. It follows that no occupied space in {y + 1,...,y} has a neighbor in equilibrium.
Now say that y ∈ {y + 1,...,y} is unoccupied and has no occupied neighbors, and that Si = θ.
Then landlord y can choose py ∈ (0,w − y − uθ + δ). If immigrant i deviates to y, then his payoff is
ui(y)(y,py,X∗
−i) = w − y − py + δ > uθ. Since py > 0 this deviation is also in the landlord’s interest.
It follows that, if (P∗,X∗) is an equilibrium outcome, then every vacant location in {y + 1,...,y} has
at least one neighbor, and no occupied location has an occupied neighbor. To complete the proof
that (3) is necessary for equilibrium, we now show that no two vacant spaces can be adjacent in
{y +1,...,y}. Say that y,y +1 ∈ {y +1,...,y} are vacant. From the above, y +2 must be occupied. If
landlord y+1 offers py+1 ∈ (0,py+2 +1) then i(y+2) will deviate to y+1 and both landlord y+1
and immigrant i(y+2) will be better off. It follows that (3) must hold in any equilibrium outcome.
27If (P∗,X∗) isanequilibrium, thenallimmigrantsmustbeindifferentbetweentheirownlocation,
and the most attractive alternative. Otherwise an immigrant could move to make himself better
off or a landlord could raise his price without causing his immigrant to move. By assumption
occupying an already occupied space entails a large penalty. Hence, the most attractive location
is either a vacant space, or θ. In any location proﬁle satisfying conditions (1)-(3) of theorem 2,
vacant locations are at best indifferent to θ. It follows that the most attractive action available to
immigrants gives payoff uθ. By construction, the price gradient in (4) is such that all immigrants
receive payoff uθ. Hence, (4) must hold in equilibrium outcomes.
Let (P∗,S∗) be a strategy proﬁle satisfying conditions (1)-(4).
By construction, all immigrants are indifferent between their own location and θ, and θ is at
least as good as any available open space. It follows that no immigrant deviates from (P∗,S∗).
Since all immigrants are indifferent between their own location, and θ, if landlord y chooses
py > p∗
y then immigrant i(y) moves and landlord y receives the opportunity cost of his land.
Conversely, if landlord y chooses py < p∗
y he decreases his payoff. It follows that py is a best
response to (P∗
−y,S∗). Thus, no landlord deviates from (P∗,S∗), and (P∗,S∗) is an equilibrium. 
Theorem 3 Assume that n > w − uθ + δ. Let y = int(w − uθ), and let t be the largest integer satisfying
2t < δ. Along any equilibrium path immigrants 1 to t occupy locations (y + 2,y + 4...,y + 2t). The
remaining immigrants occupy spaces 1,...,y or θ in any order.






w − y − uθ if y ∈ {1,...,y}
min(1,w − uθ + δ − y) if y ∈ {y + 2,y + 4,...,y + 2t}
0 else.
Given location proﬁle Xi, prices and immigrant strategies (P,SN), and location choice yi, let
χ(yi,Xi,P,SN) be an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if location yi has a neighbor in
the ﬁnal location proﬁle which follows from move yi. To improve legibility I usually suppress
arguments of χ.
Proof: I ﬁrst show that any equilibrium location proﬁle must have the form required by the
theorem.
(1) For any equilibrium strategies (P∗,S∗) there is no node at which an immigrant occupies a
position y > w + δ − uθ. Even if such a space remains without neighbors, an immigrant’s utility
at such a location is u(y,χ = 1) = w − y − py + δ. Even if py = 0, if y > w + δ − uθ, then
u(y,χ = 1) < uθ. It follows that the immigrant occupying y is better off moving to another city.
Thus, for any equilibrium strategies, (P∗,S∗), there is no node at which an immigrant occupies a
position y > w + δ − uθ, and hence, for any equilibrium location proﬁle, all y > w + δ − uθ are
vacant.
(2) For any equilibrium strategies, (P∗,S∗), there is no node at which an immigrant occupies a
position y > w − uθ if either y − 1 or y + 1 is already occupied. By construction, location y must
have a neighbor at the end of play. Hence, the utility associated with position y is u(y,χ = 0) =
w − y − py. If y > w − uθ it follows that u(y,χ = 0) < uθ for any non-negative py. It follows that
28the immigrant occupying y is better off moving to another city. Thus, if any location in the region
[w − uθ,w − uθ + δ] is occupied, its neighbors must remain vacant.
(3) If XN is the equilibrium location proﬁle associated with strategy proﬁle (P∗,S∗), then all
y < w − uθ are occupied. For the sake of contradiction, say y 6∈ XN and y < w − uθ. It follows
that proﬁts for landlord y are zero. Suppose landlord y were to choose py ∈ (0,w − uθ − y). Let i
be the last immigrant to choose a different city. If this player instead chooses y, then his payoff is
w−y− py > uθ, so that occupying location y is a best response to landlord y’s new price. It follows
that choosing py ∈ (0,w − uθ − y) increases landlord y’s proﬁts, and hence, that all y < w − uθ are
occupied in equilibrium.
(4) If XN is an equilibrium outcome, then there is no location in [w−uθ,w−uθ +δ] that does not
have at least one neighbor. For the sake of contradiction, say that y and its neighbors are vacant
with y ∈ [w − uθ,w − uθ + δ]. It follows that landlord y’s proﬁts are zero. Suppose this landlord
were to choose py ∈ (0,w − uθ + δ − y). Let i be the last immigrant to choose Si = θ. If this
player changes his move to y, then, by (1) he is assured that he will remain without neighbors at
the end of the game. Thus, choosing y rather than θ is a best response to landlord y’s new price.
Since py > 0 it follows that landlord y prefers this price, and hence that a vacant space without
neighbors cannot occur in [w − uθ,w − uθ + δ] in an equilibrium location proﬁle.
(5) Given that no three adjacent vacant spaces occur in [w − uθ,w − uθ + δ], I next show that
no two adjacent spaces can occur in this region in equilibrium. For the sake of contradiction,
suppose that y − 1 and y are vacant. By (4) y + 1 must be occupied. Suppose that landlord y
chooses py = py+1 + 1
2. We know from (2) that immigrant i(y + 1) does not have neighbors. If
immigrant i(y + 1) chooses location y over y + 1, then from (1), we know that this space will also
not have neighbors at game’s end. Thus, i(y) increases his payoff by 1/2 by choosing y over y +1.
Since such a change in price increases landlord y’s proﬁts from zero to py = py+1 + 1
2, we have a
contradiction.
(1)-(5) above establish that in any equilibrium location proﬁle must be as described in the
theorem. To ﬁnish the proof, it remains to characterize equilibrium prices and the order in which
locations are occupied.
(6) From (3) we know that all locations y ≤ y are occupied in any equilibrium outcome. For the
sake of contradiction, suppose that p∗
y 6= w − uθ − y for some y < y. Say that p∗
y > w − uθ − y
for such a location. In this case, since location y must have neighbors in any equilibrium i(y)’s
payoff is strictly less than uθ and he is better off deviating to θ. Thus, p∗
y > w − uθ − y is not an
equilibrium for y < y. Say that p∗




2(w − y − uθ − p∗
y) player i(y)’s payoff is still greater than uθ. Thus, either i(y)
stays at location y or some other immigrant deviates from θ to locate at y. Thus, the only possible
equilibrium price is p∗
y = w − uθ − y for y ≤ y.
(7) Suppose immigrant 1 occupies location y + 1. Then, by (3) we know that this location will
have a neighbor and by construction y + 1 > w − uθ. It follows that immigrant 1 is better off
playing θ. Now suppose immigrant 1 occupies y0 > y + 2. By (3), such a choice implies that
location y0 − 1 remains empty, so that landlord y0 − 1 should choose py0−1 ∈ (0,py0 + 1). In this
case, immigrant 1 will deviate to location y0 −1. Thus, immigrant 1 can only occupy y+2 or y ≤ y
29in any equilibrium.
Now suppose that landlord y + 2 chooses py+2 > 1. In this case, if immigrant 1 occupies y + 2,
landlord y + 3 should offer a low price py+3 ∈ (0,max{py+2 − 1,1}) and player 1 should deviate.
Thus, py+2 > 1. On the other hand, as long as py+2 ≤ 1 there is no non-negative price at which
immigrant 1 will deviate from y+2 to y+3. Thus, landlord y+2 chooses py+2 = 1 in equilibrium.
It follows that immigrant 1 occupies location y + 2 at price py+2 = 1.
Similar logic establishes that immigrant 2 occupies location y + 4 at price 1, and so on. Im-
migrant t however, will occupy the last suburban location, and if w − (y + 2t) + δ < 1, then
py+2t = w−(y+2t)+δ. Afterallsuburbanlocationsareoccupied, subsequentimmigrantsoccupy
location in {1,...,y}. By (6) these locations all result in reservation utility level so they are occupied
in any order. 
Theorem 4 Suppose that w − y − δ and w − y + δ are not integers and that n > w − uθ + δ. Then there
is a unique optimal location proﬁle, X∗∗, and this proﬁle satisﬁes the following three conditions:
1. All y ≤ y∗∗ are occupied, where y∗∗ = int(w − uθ − δ).
2. All y > y are vacant, where y = int(w − uθ + δ).
3. Alternate locations are occupied in the set {y∗∗,...,y}.
Proof: Suppose X∗∗ does not satisfy at least one of conditions (1) - (3).
If X∗∗ does not satisfy condition (1), then there is some smallest vacant y0 < y∗∗. If some
immigrant i moves from θ to y0, then at most one immigrant, y0 + 1, is deprived of open space
beneﬁts. Thus, the change in W associated with i’s move to y0 is at least w − y0 − uθ − δ. Since
y0 < y∗∗ by hypothesis, this change is positive. Thus, X∗∗ cannot be an optimal location proﬁle if
condition (1) is not satisﬁed.
If X∗∗ does not satisfy condition (2), then there is some largest occupied y0 > y. Even if immig-
rant i(y0) hasno neighborsin X∗∗, hismoveto θ resultsin achange inwelfareof −(w−y0 +δ−uθ).
By hypothesis, y0 > y, so this quantity is positive. It follows that if X∗∗ does not satisfy condition
(2) it is not optimal.
If X∗∗ does not satisfy condition (3), then the region {y∗∗,...,y} either contains two adjacent
occupied spaces, or two adjacent vacant spaces. First consider the case when there are adjacent
occupied spaces. Say y0 and y0 + 1 are the two most extreme adjacent occupied spaces. If i(y0)
moves to θ, then i(y0 + 1)’s payoff increases by δ since he now has open spaces on either side.
Tenant i(y0)’s payoff also increases since w − y0 < uθ. Thus, if there are two adjacent occupied
spaces in {y∗∗,...,y}, then X∗∗ is not optimal.
Now suppose that there are two adjacent vacant spaces in {y∗∗,...,y}, and let y0 and y0 + 1
denote the two most extreme such spaces. Suppose that there is at least one occupied location
more extreme that y0 + 1, and that y00 is the least extreme of these locations. If i(y00) moves from
y00 to y0 + 1 then he decreases his commuting costs by y00 − (y0 + 1), does not forego his own open
space beneﬁt, and does not cause anyone else to lose their open space beneﬁt. Finally, suppose that
there are two adjacent open spaces in {y∗∗,...,y} and there is no more remote occupied location. In
30this case, some immigrant who chose θ can choose y0 +1 and get a payoff w − (y0 +1) + δ > uθ. It
follows that any optimal location proﬁle must satisfy condition (3).
We now show that any location proﬁle satisfying (1)-(3) is optimal.
First note that W(X) is bounded above and below. A lower bound of W(X) is obtained if we
suppose that every immigrant receives the payoff associated with occupying the most extreme
location in Y and having a neighbor. An upper bound of W(X) is obtained if we suppose that
every immigrant in N receives the payoff associated with location 1 and not having a neighbor.
Since both N and Y are ﬁnite, it follows that W(X) is bounded above and below. Second, since
Y is a ﬁnite set by assumption, there are a ﬁnite number of possible location proﬁles. It follows
that the set {W(X)}X⊂Y is a ﬁnite bounded subset of the real numbers. It follows immediately that
{W(X)}X⊂Y has a largest element, and hence that there exists a non-empty set of optimal location
proﬁles.
Since we know that the set of optimal location proﬁles is non-empty, and that each must satisfy
conditions (1)-(3), if there is a unique location proﬁle satisfying (1)-(3) if follows that such a proﬁle
must be optimal. By inspection of conditions (1)-(3) it is clear that there is exactly one location
proﬁle satisfying the conditions. It follows that this proﬁle must be the unique optimal location
proﬁle.
Theorem 5 Let y = int(w − (1− γ)uθ + δ) and y = int(w − (1− γ)uθ). If n > y then any equilibrium
of the dynamic game satisﬁes:
1. In any equilibrium location proﬁle X∗
N all spaces y > y are vacant.
2. In any equilibrium location proﬁle X∗
N all locations y ≤ y are occupied, and they are occupied before
any immigrant chooses θ.
3. Before any immigrant chooses θ alternate spaces are occupied in the region {y + 1,...,y}, with y + 2
occupied ﬁrst and progressively more extreme alternate locations occupied in sequence.
Proof: An immigrant occupying an arbitrary space can achieve no greater payoff than 1
1−γ(w −
y + δ), which occurs only in the event that py = 0 and the location is without neighbors in
perpetuity. If an immigrant occupies a location y0 > y, then Ui(y0,k) ≤ 1
1−γ(w − (y + 1) + δ).
From the deﬁnition of y, it follows immediately that Ui(y0,k) < uθ. Therefore, there is no node
such that S∗
i > y. It follows immediately that condition (1) must hold in equilibrium.
By (1), we know that there is no node such that a location greater than y is ever occupied in
equilibrium. Since n > y by hypothesis, it follows that some immigrant chooses θ.
Let y0 be the least extreme vacant location in Xi. Since location 0 is occupied, y0 must have at
least one neighbor. It follows that no immigrant will ever pay more that w − y − uθ to occupy y0.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose immigrant i chooses θ when y ≤ y is vacant. Then Ui = uθ
and the largest possible payoff for landlord y0 is Πy0 = γi+1(w − y − uθ). If landlord y0 chooses
pi
y0 ∈ (γ(w − y − uθ),(w − y − uθ)), then immigrant i can occupy location y0 for a payoff strictly
larger than uθ. Moreover, by construction, γipi
y0 > γi+1(w − y − uθ). It follows that there is no
node at which immigrant i chooses θ when y ≤ y is vacant. Since n > y by hypothesis, condition
(2) follows.
31The proof of condition (3) is in three parts. (A) In equilibrium there is no node such that a
location y0 ∈ {y + 2,...,y} is occupied when y0 − 1 and y0 − 2 are also vacant. This implies that
suburban locations are occupied in order from y to y, and that there is at most one vacant space
between occupied locations. (B) In equilibrium there is no node such that a location in {y +1,...,y}
with a neighbor is ever occupied. Together with (A), this implies that there is at least one vacant
space between occupied locations. (C) There is no node at which an immigrant chooses θ if there
are three adjacent vacant locations in {y + 2,...,y}. With (A) and (B), this implies that alternate
spaces throughout the suburbs are occupied before immigrants begin choosing θ. Together, these
conditions assure that condition (3) holds.
Begin with (B). Let (S∗
Y,S∗
N) be an equilibrium. Then there is no node such that S∗
i = y0 when
y0 > y and y0 − 1 or y0 + 1 is occupied. Say location y0 − 1 is occupied and y0 > y. Then immigrant













i = y0 is not a best response. Si = θ gives immigrant i a strictly higher payoff.
(A) Let (S∗
Y,S∗
N) be an equilibrium. Then there is no node such that S∗
i = y0 when y0 > y + 1
and y0 − 1 and y0 − 2 are vacant. Let (S∗
Y,S∗
N) be an equilibrium. Say S∗
i = y0 when y0 > y + 1 and
y0 − 1 and y0 − 2 are vacant. By (B), if y0 is occupied then location y0 − 1 cannot be occupied and
landlord y0 − 1’s payoff is zero. Since py0 ≥ 0 the interval (0,py0 + 1
1−γ) is non-empty. Suppose
landlord y0 − 1 chooses py0−1 ∈ (0,py0 + 1
1−γ) and immigrant i deviates from S∗
i = y0 to y0 − 1. By
(B) immigrant i is assured that he will never have neighbors. Therefore,
Ui(y0 − 1,∞) =
1
1− γ



















(w − y + δ) − py0
= Ui(y0,∞).
Therefore this deviation is in immigrant i’s interest. Since it results in a positive rather than a zero
payoff for landlord y0 − 1, it is also in this landlord’s interest. Condition (A) follows.
(C) There is no node at which an immigrant chooses θ if there are three adjacent vacant locations
in {y,...,y}. Say y0 −1, y0, y0 +1 ∈ {y,...,y} are vacant and immigrant i chooses θ. The most that any
immigrant will pay to locate at y0 is 1
(1−γ)(w − y0 + δ) − uθ. If immigrant i chooses θ the highest
payoff possible for landlord y0 is Πy0 = γi+1( 1
(1−γ)(w − y0 + δ) − uθ). Suppose that landlord y0
chooses pi
y0 ∈ (γ( 1
(1−γ)(w − y0 + δ) − uθ),( 1
(1−γ)(w − y0 + δ) − uθ)). Since γ < 1 this interval is not
empty. If accepted in period i, any such price gives the landlord a higher payoff than is possible
32otherwise. If immigrant i deviates from θ to y0, then by (B) he will have no neighbors in perpetuity








(w − y0 + δ) − (
1
1− γ
(w − y0 + δ) − uθ)
> uθ.
Therefore, this deviation is in the interest of landlord y0 and immigrant i. Condition (C) follows. 
Theorem 6 Let y = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ + δ) and y = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ). If n > y, then in any
equilibrium of the dynamic game, if immigrant i chooses location y ∈ {y,...,y} then pi
y ≤ 1
1−γ.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction, say that pi
y > 1
1−γ and immigrant i occupies y for some
y ∈ {y,...,y} . By the same logic used in the proof of (3)(B) of theorem 5, immigrant i has no




(w − y + δ) − pi
y
and landlord y + 1 is assured of a zero payoff.





1−γ by hypothesis, this interval
is not empty. If immigrant i deviates to y + 1 then, by the logic used in the proof of theorem 5
(3)(b) and recalling that more remote suburban locations are occupied later, this location too has
no neighbors in perpetuity. Thus,
Ui(y − 1,∞) =
1
1− γ


















1−γ is not an equilibrium. 
Theorem 7 Let y = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ) and l ∈ {0,...,y} an integer. Suppose n > w − (1 − γ)uθ + δ
and δ > l
γn. Then, in any equilibrium, all y ∈ {y − l,...,y} are occupied after the ﬁrst suburban location,
y + 2, is occupied.
Proof: For any equilibrium, the proof establishes an upper bound on immigrant payoffs from
locating at y ∈ {y − l,...,y}, and a lower bound on immigrant payoffs at y + 2. It then shows that
the upper bound of immigrant payoffs at y ∈ {y−l,...,y} is less than the lower bound from locating
at y + 2. The result then follows immediately.
If immigrant i locates at y ≤ y then his payoff can be no larger than would occur if landlord





(w − y + (1− γn−i)δ). (6)
From theorem 6, we know that pi
y+2 can be no larger than 1
1−γ if Si = y + 2. From the proof of
theorem 5, we know that for any equilibrium, if i locates at y + 2 then he has no neighbors in
perpetuity. Thus, if immigrant i locates at y + 2,
Ui(y + 2,kN) ≥
1
1− γ




Immigrant i will choose y before y + 2 only if
Ui(y,kN) ≥ Ui(y + 2,∞).
Using equation 6 and 7, we see that this can occur only if
1
1− γ
(w − y + (1− γn−i)δ) ≥
1
1− γ





γn−iδ ≤ y − y. (8)
Since l ≥ y − y by hypothesis, and γn−iδ ≥ γnδ, it follows that Equation 8 holds under the
hypothesized condition, δ > l
γn. The result follows immediately. 
Theorem 8 Let y∗∗ = int(w − (1 − γ)uθ − δ). If (X∗∗
i )i∈{1,...,n,N} is an optimal sequence of location
proﬁles and δ > 1, then for all i no two adjacent locations more extreme than y∗∗ are occupied in X∗∗
i .







i ) − (w − y0 − (1− γ)uθ) + δ.
That is, W(X0
i) is equal to W(X∗∗
i ) plus the difference in the surplus generated by locations y0 and
y0 + 1 when immigrant i(y0) moves to the alternate city. Rearranging gives,
W(X0
i) −W(X∗∗
i ) = y0 − (w − δ − (1− γ)uθ)).
By hypothesis, y0 ≥ int(w − δ − (1− γ)uθ) + 1, so
W(X0
i) −W(X∗∗
i ) ≥ [int(w − δ − (1− γ)uθ) + 1]
−[w − δ − (1− γ)uθ]
> 0.

34Theorem 9 Let X∗∗
N be a socially optimal location proﬁle. Let y and y0 be two occupied locations in this
proﬁle such that y0 > y, and, neither y nor y0 has neighbors. Then y is occupied before y0.
Proof: By contradiction. Say (X∗∗
i )i∈{1,...,n,N} is optimal, with y0 > y in X∗∗
N , neither y nor y0 has
neighbors, and y is occupied before y0. Let (X0
i)i∈{1,...,n,N} be identical to (X∗∗
i )i∈{1,...,n,N} except that
the order in which y and y0 are occupied is reversed, thus i0(y) = i∗∗(y0) and i0(y0) = i∗∗(y) so that







j=i∗∗(y)γj(w − y0 − (1− γ)uθ) + δ)
+Σ
i∗∗(y0)
j=i∗∗(y)γj(w − y − (1− γ)uθ) + δ).
Since y < y0, it follows that WN((X0
i)i∈{1,...,n,N}) > WN((X∗∗
i )i∈{1,...,n,N}), a contradiction. 
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